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TREATMENT REFUSALS FOR THE CRITICALLY
AND TERMINALLY ILL: PROPOSED RULES FOR
THE FAMILY, THE PHYSICIAN, AND THE STATE
STEVEN A. NEWMAN*
In the decade following the landmark decision of In re
Quinlan,' questions surrounding the cessation of medical treat-
ment for the critically and terminally ill have continued to gen-
erate controversy and confusion. "Death with dignity" has be-
come an important and popular concept,2 but a consensus on
how to achieve it has eluded us. Recent news articles report the
uncertainties felt by medical practitioners about the legalities
and ethics of withholding or withdrawing treatment.3 Inconsis-
tent practices exist from hospital to hospital, and, within the
same hospital, from doctor to doctor. Avoiding the risk of legal
liability has sometimes taken precedence over compassionate,
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 933 (1976).
2. As Samuel Gorovitz observes:
A death can occur too soon or too late. Further, there is the question of how
it will come about. There are dyings that are slow and agonizing and dyings that
are gentle and graceful .... It seems reasonable that if death is impending, one
should want to exert some influence on the mode of one's dying. Just as one
wants to be able to influence the major events that shape and constitute a life at
earlier stages, one may want to avoid the indignity of having to witness and
endure a final stage not as an effective agent, but merely a deteriorating object.
GOROVITz, DOCTORS' DILEMMAS: MORAL CONFLICT AND MEDICAL CARE 153 (1982) [herein-
after cited as GOROVITZ].
According to a 1981 Harris poll, by a margin of 78% to 19%, the majority of Ameri-
cans think that "a patient with a terminal disease ought to be able to tell his doctor to
let him die rather than to extend his life when no cure is in sight." By 73% to 23%,
Americans believe that the family of a terminally ill irreversibly comatose person ought
to be able to tell doctors to remove all life-support services and let the patient die. And a
majority of Americans, by a 56-41 percent margin, even accept the notion that the termi-
nally ill should be able "to tell the doctor to put him out of his misery," an apparent
reference to active euthanasia. 39 THE HARRIS SURVEY (1981).
3. See Kleiman, Uncertainty Clouds Care of the Dying, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, at
B1, col. 1; Sullivan, State Officials Drafting a Bill on Withholding Life Support, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Kleiman, Doctors Ask, Who Lives? When to Die?
N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at B1, col. 1.
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humane medical care.'
Despite current uncertainties in the law, consensus has
emerged on some major points. First, there is widespread agree-
ment among courts today that individuals in our society have
the right to refuse medical treatment.5 This right is paramount
to the interests of the state in preserving life and preventing sui-
cide, and to any interest of medical professionals in providing
maximal care.6
Second, there is general agreement that incompetent pa-
tients who are unable to make such decisions for themselves pre-
serve the right to refuse treatment.7 In the words of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the right "must extend
to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient
because the value of human dignity extends to both."' Since in-
competents are unable to assert the right, some means must be
found to allow others to assert it effectively on their behalf.
Further common ground exists with respect to the appropri-
ateness of exercising the treatment refusal right of an incompe-
tent who is in a permanent vegetative state.9 Most of the court
decisions in this area, starting with the case of Karen Ann Quin-
lan, deal with individuals in this extreme condition. Persons in
this state function only on a "vegetative" level, with their bodies
capable of maintaining body temperature, blood pressure, heart
rate, and other biological functions not requiring conscious con-
4. See supra, note 3.
5. See, e.g., In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The medical profession's interest had sometimes been given
considerable weight in the past, see, e.g., U.S. v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn.
1965), but changing norms in the medical profession and a societal rejection of maximal
care as an unwarranted burden on dying patients has destroyed its former power. Com-
pare In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 646 (doctors oppose stopping treatment) with In
re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (doctors support stopping treatment). The only
interest that may override the individual's right to decline treatment is the societal inter-
est in the welfare of minor children of that individual. See In re Winthrop Hospital, -
Misc.2d -, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1985) (court grants order permit-
ting blood transfusion should surgeon deem it necessary to save religious objector's life
when religious objector is mother of infant).
6. See supra, note 5.
7. See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 and cases collected therein at 339.
8. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977).
9. See cases collected in In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339.
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trol.10 When patients in this condition have previously expressed
a wish not to be maintained on respirators or other artificial life
support systems, courts have required that those wishes be
respected." Legislatures in many states also support this result
in "Living Will" or "Natural Death" statutes.2 Even if no prior
expression of intent was made, courts have authorized the with-
holding or withdrawing of life support equipment from irreversi-
bly vegetative patients when asked to do so by the patient's
family or guardian.' s This result is also approved of by the
American Medical Association 4 and the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research' (hereinafter the President's
Commission).
Certain areas of disagreement have arisen, however, con-
cerning the procedures by which decisions to stop treatment are
to be made. Controverted questions involve the precise roles
that physicians, families, courts, and district attorneys should
play in this type of decisionmaking. Other questions have yet to
receive widespread legal attention, particularly those posed by
incompetent persons who are severely ill, but not irreversibly co-
matose or permanently vegetative.' Under what circumstances,
10. The patient may, without consciousness, make motions such as chewing and eye
blinking, and even have a sleep/wake cycle, but there is no cognitive function at all. The
condition is usually brought on by lack of oxygen to the brain, which destroys all areas of
the brain except the brain stem within three to five minutes. Technically the victim is
not "terminally ill" since the vegetative state can continue for an indefinite time ex-
tending over many years. The longest known vegetative state lasted 37 years. R.
Cranford, Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL AS-
PECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 63-76 (Doudera and Peters
eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS]; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647 (expert medical testimony).
11. E.g., In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; In re Blud-
worth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
12. E.g., CAL. NATURAL DEATH ACT, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 et. seq. (West
1985).
13. E.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
14. Statement by the Judicial Council, A.M.A. (1982), reprinted in President's Com-
mission, infra note 15, at 299.
15. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 181-83 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
16. Only four cases involving such situations have reached the highest state courts: In
1985]
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and by whom, are decisions to be made to withhold or withdraw
life sustaining treatment from these individuals? This article
will explore these issues and recommend appropriate decision-
making roles for the various participants. The particular circum-
stances addressed are those in which (1) severely, irreversibly ill
patients are incapable of making their own decisions, and (2)
one or more family members exist who care about such patients'
welfare and who are willing to be involved in decisionmaking on
their behalf.
While some of today's treatment/nontreatment decisions
may be relatively new ones posed by the availability of modern
medical techniques, the basic problems they raise are not with-
out precedent. Past experience, coupled with a close examina-
tion of the human values, ethics, and cultural forces at work to-
day, offer some guidelines to resolve the decisionmaking
dilemmas we face. The law, as one major cultural element which
can influence behavior, is a special focus here, but it is well to
remember that legal rules alone can not dictate the course of
complex human interactions. If, as will be discussed here, good
decisionmaking is dependent upon the careful development of
information, genuine communication among the people involved,
personal choices among moral and philosophical values, and the
presence of human sensitivity and empathy, then rules of law,
however well thought out, can play only a supportive role in the
real-life dramas we are considering.
LEGITIMACY OF NON-TREATMENT DECISIONS
Decisions not to treat severely ill, incompetent persons are
generally acceptable on three grounds. First, as a matter of self-
determination, if the individual has previously expressed a de-
sire to refuse treatment in specified medical circumstances, and
those circumstances later arise, the previously expressed wishes
should be followed. This is illustrated by the well-known case of
Brother Fox,1 7 a member of a Catholic order who enjoyed good
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 426 N.E.2d 64,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417. In time the proliferation of these cases may make Quinlan-type
situations of persons in permanent vegetative states seem like easy cases.
17. In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266.
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health until he was 83 years of age.18 After undergoing surgery
for a hernia, he experienced cardiac arrest, suffered substantial
brain damage as result of oxygen deprivation, and went into a
coma. 19 He was quickly put on a mechanical respirator, but it
became clear that the coma was irreversible.2 Based upon
Brother Fox's own statements prior to his hospitalization, indi-
cating he did not want such "extraordinary business" done for
him should he ever be in an irreversible state like that of Karen
Ann Quinlan, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that life
support systems should be withdrawn.2 While this case involved
an individual in a permanent vegetative state, the same princi-
ple of respect for self-determined treatment refusals applies
with equal force to persons in non-vegetative conditions.
The second ground for withholding treatment from incom-
petent patients is the desire not to prolong the act of dying. In-
dividuals described as "on the threshold of death" can be artifi-
cially suspended there by machines that keep minimal biological
functions going. The patient in Leach v. Akron General Medical
Center22 was suffering from the progressive and fatal disease
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (also known as "Lou Gehrig's dis-
ease").2 The disease had progressed to the point that the pa-
tient was described by the court as "semi-comatose," irreversibly
brain damaged, and without "hope of regaining cognitive or sa-
pient powers. 212 The judge appropriately concluded that there
existed "no possible benefit to the State ... in extending mini-
mal life" and authorized the disconnection of mechanical life
supports.2 5 While the patient in this case had expressed her wish
while competent not to be artificially maintained in such a con-
dition, the court's observation that society should not insist on
medical intervention to prolong dying applies equally to simi-
larly ill persons who have not previously expressed their desires
concerning treatment. Courts in various states have so held.2
18. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
22. 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Comm. Pleas 1980).
23. Id. at 5, 426 N.E.2d at 812.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 12, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
26. E.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re L.H.R.,
19851
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Another common intervention at what otherwise would be
the moment of dying is cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
While many individuals are benefitted by CPR, its benefits are
less clear when it forestalls the death of a patient who is in the
final stages of terminal illness. Medical professional organiza-
tions accept the validity of orders not to resuscitate certain pa-
tients,'27 and the one case addressing this issue found orders not
to resuscitate appropriate for the hopelessly ill patient whose
death is imminent.28 Rejection of emergency resuscitation is con-
sistent with rejection of respirators and other life support inter-
ventions, and the acceptablity of the latter logically mandates
acceptance of do-not-resuscitate orders. When the condition of a
critically, incurably ill patient is deteriorating, and death is inev-
itably expected, aggressive and violent 9 resuscitation efforts
should not be required.
The final ground upon which treatment refusals can be jus-
tified, humane concern for the victim of critical illness, presents
more difficulty. We may know little of the wishes of the patient
(as is common in a society where death is frequently not talked
about) and death may not be imminent, yet certain situations
still seem to call for withholding or discontinuing aggressive
medical treatment.
Medical professionals acknowledge that they have termi-
nated treatment of very ill persons on humane grounds. One
neurosurgeon writes: "Many physicians have let patients die.
These actions were right and humane in order to stop the need-
less prolongation of agony. We have refrained from ordering
medication to support blood pressure. We have stopped antibi-
otics to control fatal infections "8.... ,0 This has been done with
253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984).
27. See, e.g., Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency
Cardiac Care (ECC), 227 J. A.M.A. 837, 864 (1974); other medical guidelines for issuing
"do not resuscitate" orders are provided in App. A-F in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS,
supra note 10.
28. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
29. See id. at 468-469, 380 N.E.2d at 135-36. The court noted that "[m]any of these
procedures (used in CPR) are obviously highly intrusive, and some are violent in nature.
The defibrillator, for example, causes violent (and painful) muscle contractions which, in
a patient suffering (as this patient is) from osteoporosis, may cause fracture of vertebrae
or other bones. Such fractures, in turn, cause pain, which may be extreme."
30. HEIFETZ, THE RIGHT TO DIE: A NEUROSURGEON SPEAKS OF DEATH WITH CANDOR 5
[Vol. III
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the concurrence of families for many years.3 1 Recent surveys in-
dicate that the majority of doctors now accept the idea of pas-
sive euthanasia, i.e., ceasing to treat some hopelessly ill
patients.32
Humane concerns encompass the desire not to inflict need-
less pain and suffering, and the desire to preserve the patient's
human dignity. Avoidance of pain and suffering is a widely ac-
cepted goal in our culture, and provides a strong incentive to
avoid treatments which are themselves painful, or which prolong
the life of a critically ill person who suffers constant pain while
he remains alive. It is understandably a commonly agreed upon
important factor in many decisions to stop treatment.33
Humane concerns about preserving human dignity are per-
vasive in cases, statutes and medical literature.3 4 The term "dig-
nity" seems to encompass a cluster of concerns. They can be cat-
egorized as concerns for the individual's privacy, independence,
bodily integrity and self-control, emotional equilibrium, and
need for meaning and purpose in life. Medical treatments which
diminish these life qualities are experienced by many in our cul-
ture as extremely burdensome."
(1975); See D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 38-40 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as D.
MAGUIRE].
31. See, In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385 n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75-76 n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, 277-78 n.3 (sources cited in dissent of Jones, J.).
32. Id. This does not mean that all doctors who believe in letting people die necessa-
rily act on their beliefs. See infra text accompanying notes 102-58.
33. What is less understandable is the apparent practice of many physicians of not
providing sufficient pain medication for dying patients. One writer, a psychiatrist who
observed the routine undermedication for pain in a burn clinic, suggests that uncon-
scious psychological needs of health care providers lead them to these inadequate pre-
scribing practices. His rational attempts to inform the medical staff of pain medications
available, their efficiency, and the low risk of untoward side effects, failed to change
physician behavior. Perry, The Undermedication of Pain: A Psychoanalytic Perspective,
BULL. A. PSYCHOANALYTIC MED. 77 (June 1983). A leading medical journal devoted an
editorial to this widespread problem, urging doctors to alleviate pain more effectively
when they could. Angel, The Quality of Mercy, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 98 (1982). See
also, MDs Urged to Alter Prescribing Patterns for Dying Cancer Patients in Pain, Am.
Med. News, Feb. 18, 1983, p. 5.
34. E.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332; CAL. NATURAL DEATH ACT, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7185 et seq. (West 1985).
35. Forcing stressful, invasive, or undignified treatments on hopelessly ill patients
arouses intense feelings of anger and bitterness on the part of caring family members.
For three compelling examples, see Crawshaw, Technical Zeal or Therapeutic Pur-
pose-How to Decide, 250 J. A.M.A. 1857 (1983); Walter, A Little Music, PENNSYLVANIA
GAZETTE 16 (April 1983); Ferber, I Cried, but Not for Irma, READER'S DIG. 92 (April
1976).
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Irreversibly, severely ill patients often are subject to signifi-
cant losses of personal dignity. Disease itself is one source of this
loss; the most extreme case, that of the permanent vegetative
state, deprives the individual of meaningful existence and of any
independence or conscious self-control over body or mind.
For very ill persons in non-vegetative physical states, exten-
sive losses of the various aspects of dignity result from the com-
bination of physical condition and medical treatment. Privacy is
lost with repeated visits of technicians tending machines or with
the constant handling and monitoring of intensive care. A help-
less dependence on others develops when basic hygiene and fun-
damental body function are beyond one's own physical or
mental capacity. Bodily integrity and self-control may be lost to
invasive tests and procedures and to inserted tubes and cathe-
ters. Emotional equilibrium may be upset not only by one's ill-
ness, but by the pain, fear, isolation and anxiety caused by hos-
pitalization and by stressful treatment regimens.
What impairs the meaningfulness of life is a more philo-
sophical question, perhaps, than the rest. In states approaching
the vegetative, there is virtually undetectable cognitive, emo-
tional or sensory functioning; there is minimal interaction with
the environment. Some physical movement may exist but it
lacks any thought or emotion associated with it. At this extreme,
life certainly has lost meaning. Generally describing the point at
which life loses meaning is much more problematic. One physi-
cian suggests that meaningful life involves "not mere biological
existence of several organs but totally integrated functional exis-
tence at a rational human level. '86 Another suggests, "for life to
be meaningful, there must be sufficient cerebral function to en-
able the person to appreciate it, and there must be freedom from
unendurable pain or suffering of other kinds. ' ' 37 The emphasis
on rationality in the first statement reflects a high value on
mental soundness and intelligence (not surprising in a profes-
sional) but may be too weighted toward cognitive ability for
many of us to accept. The second doctor's emphasis on "appreci-
36. . Collins, Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging Life, 206 J. A.M.A. 389
(1968).
37. Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387
(1968).
[Vol. III
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ation" of life has much appeal but provokes many questions
about just what is meant.
My point here is not to delve into the philosophical mean-
ing of life but to indicate its varieties of expression, and the dif-
ferences in meaning life holds for each of us. The differences are
inevitable in a social system that values freedom of thought, and
they pose a choice in the medical treatment context now under
consideration. Should the meaningfulness of life be a factor to
consider in these matters, or does its variety of forms of expres-
sion and belief indicate it is best left out of the calculus of
decision?
I suggest this difficult concept must remain among the deci-
sionmaker's array of relevant factors. Whether we can define it
precisely or not, the issue is nevertheless of fundamental impor-
tance to us. No doubt law, medicine, and morality would be sim-
pler without such issues. But disregarding difficult questions dis-
torts decisionmaking, it does not improve it. Moreover,
attempting to delete a fundamental value from its rightful place
does not drive it away, but rather underground, where it influ-
ences decisions in unconscious and unexamined ways.
In dealing with all of the dignity concerns previously identi-
fied, it is apparent we are dealing with aspects of the quality of
life. Assessing the quality of another's life, for the purpose of
deciding whether to withhold medical treatments, is staunchly
resisted by some observers. 8 But to refuse to consider severely
diminished quality of life in medical decisionmaking for the very
ill again distorts the decisionmaking process by leaving out
something of great importance. Consider the case of a patient
described in one medical journal,3" who is severely demented.40
She is confined to a wheelchair."' She rarely utters a word, and
has negligible interactions with other human beings.2 She is
38. The New York Court of Appeals has been the most adamant on this point, de-
claring that no one may decide that "the patient's quality of life has declined to a point
where treatment should be withheld and the patient should be allowed to die." People v.
Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 357, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436,.446 (1984).
39. Lo and Dornbrand, Sounding Board: Guiding the Hand that Feeds-Caring for
the Demented Elderly, 311 NEW ENG, J. MED. 402 (1984).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1985]
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kept in diapers because of incontinence. 43 A time comes when
she eventually stops eating, rejecting all offers of food.4 Doctors
and family wonder whether a feeding tube should be inserted.45
If they do, and the woman pulls it out, must she then be tied
down, as demented patients often are?"' Of course, we would
want more information about the severity of her physical
problems, her prognosis, her values prior to the onset of demen-
tia. But the concern for her freedom from forcible restraint, her
bodily integrity, her independence and privacy, and the mean-
ingfulness of life to her, in short, her dignity, are unavoidable
and of great significance. Such concerns are not reducible to pre-
cise terms, their weight on the decisionmaking scale is not sub-
ject to exact calculation. Some decisionmaker must take them
into account, along with several other variables, and that deci-
sionmaker must be vested with the wide discretion necessary to
make such a complex, multi-factor decision. That deci-
sionmaker, it is suggested, should be the patient's family, for the
reasons discussed in the following section.
THE FAMILY AS DECISIONMAKER
Despite the problematic nature of choosing anyone to make
critical decisions for another human being, I suggest that here
the solution, for the vast majority of cases, is the designation of
the family as decisionmaker for critically or terminally ill incom-
petent patients.4 7 In some situations the family will be inappro-
priate or incapable of deciding, and other means of decision will
have to be arranged." But in the usual run of events, the family
will be able to reach a decision that is within the range of ac-
ceptability, and in such cases its decision should be followed.
The justifications for family decisionmaking derive from ex-
perience, custom and tradition, and from certain values which
are fundamental in our society.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 403.
47. This presumes that the patient has not previously designated a specific person to
make medical decisions for him in the event of incompetency. Such a designation is an
expression of the patient's right to self-determination,and should be respected. See CAL.
CIv. CODE § 2500 et seq. (West 1985); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5602 (Purdon 1975).
48. E.g., when there is irreconcilable conflict among family members, when family
members are ill-motivated, or when family members evince no interest in the patient.
[Vol. III
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Experience shows that families commonly exhibit the great-
est degree of concern about the welfare of ailing family mem-
bers. It is they who come to the hospital and involve themselves
in the sick person's care and comfort. Competent patients usu-
ally actively solicit the advice and counsel of family members in
decisionmaking.19 Family members routinely ask questions of
the medical staff about the patient's condition and prognosis;
one study found they frequently asked more questions than pa-
tients themselves did.50 Family members, in fact, commonly act
as advocates for patients in the hospital, looking out for their
comfort, care, and best interests 1Decisionmaking by the family
on behalf of incompetent, ill members is a matter of tradition in
American society. A study performed for the Presidential Com-
mission investigating health care practices in the United States
found that when a patient was incompetent "a family member
was automatically enlisted to make a proxy decision." 52 A 1973
statement of the American Medical Association concerning the
withdrawal of life support systems similarly maintained that the
decison is that "of the patient and/or his immediate family. The
advice and judgment of the physician should be freely available
to the patient and/or his immediate family. '58 For comatose pa-
tients, doctors look to the closest relative for major decisionmak-
ing.5 4 Unfortunately, doctors follow the same custom with family
members that they do with competent patients: they present
only their recommended treatment for approval or disapproval,
not the full range of treatment options available.5 5 For some
treatments, they don't bother seeking permission from anyone.56
49. Lidz and Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 317, 363 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Lidz and Meisel].
50. Id. at 396-97.
51. D. WALTON, ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 147 (1983) [herein-
after cited as D. WALTON]; Gold, When Someone Dies in the Hospital, AGING, June-July
1984, at 18.
52. Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49, at 362.
53. Branson and Casebeer, Obscuring the Role of the Physician, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
8 (Feb. 1976).
54. Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49, at 358.
55. Id. at 359.
56. Id. at 367. The problems posed by these physician practices are considered infra
text accompanying notes 102-158.
1985]
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The law reflects this family-oriented tradition as well. Gen-
erally speaking, families make decisions for incompetent mem-
bers. 7 The courts will not substitute their own "best interests"
judgment for that of the family, absent a showing of bad motives
or significant deleterious effect on the incompetent.5 8 This tradi-
tion informs several of the right to refuse treatment cases as
well. The Quinlan decision authorized Karen Ann's father to
make the decision to disconnect his daughter from a respirator."
A California court, dismissing murder charges against two doc-
tors who disconnected a respirator in accordance with the wishes
of the patient's family, noted that the patient's wife was the
proper surrogate decisionmaker for her comatose husband."' The
few statutes that exist on the subject of withholding or with-
drawing life sustaining treatment also support the role of the
family as surrogate decisionmaker," but the handful of recent
cases are divided on the matter.62
Family members have a unique knowledge of the patient
which is vital to any decision on his or her behalf. For patients
who were formerly competent but now are not, their closest rela-
tions will know their life style, values, medical attitudes, and
general world view.63 Sometimes they will know specifically what
the patient, when competent, felt about mechanical life-support
* 57. See, e.g., In re Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 474 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2d Dept. 1984)
(abortion decision for retarded 25 year old made by her father), appeal dismissed, 64
N.Y.2d 866, 476 N.E.2d 994, 487 N.Y.S.2d 549, (1985); Matter of Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d
648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, (1979) (unorthodox laetrile treatment chosen for
a child with cancer); In re Roll, 117 N.J. Super. 122, 283 A.2d 764 (1971).
58. Id.
59. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
60. Barber v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-322 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1983); VA. CODE § 54-
325.8:6 (1984).
62. Compare In re Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, with In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (court cannot authorize family to make decision) and In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (court rejects mother's decision for treatment re-
fusal). I suggest that Spring and Storar are wrong on this point.
63. Benjamin Cardozo observed:
We are reminded by William James in a telling page of his lectures on Prag-
matism that every one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of life, even
those of us to whom the names and the notions of philosophy are unknown or
anathema. There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to
call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and
action.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921).
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and other techniques to prolong life in case of incurable illness. 4
In other cases, they will know of some statements which bear
upon the specific question of treatment/nontreatment that later
arises, but which are not clearly conclusive. 5
But even if no prior specific statements were made, in the
context of the individual's entire prior mental life, including his
or her philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values
about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and
attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and
death, that individual's likely treatment/nontreatment prefer-
ences can be discovered. Family members are most familiar with
this entire life context. Articulating such knowledge is a formi-
dable task, requiring a literary skill beyond the capacity of
many, perhaps most, families. But the family's knowledge exists
nevertheless, intuitively felt by them and available as an impor-
tant decisionmaking tool.66
The family's knowledge of the life of the incompetent per-
son will usually be extensive, or in any event much deeper than
that possessed by hospital staff doctors, attending physicians
(especially in this society of mobile individuals and ever fewer
family practitioners), guardians ad litem, or judges. This is par-
ticularly important in the context of medicial decisionmaking for
the severely ill, where the physical condition of the patient may
deteriorate rapidly, or where clinical crises (fevers, infections)
may arise without advance notice. In these circumstances time is
a major constraint. Treatment/nontreatment decisions must be
made within the time available. Involved family members are
both readily accessible and possessed of enough knowledge
about the patient to make the necessary decision. Courts are too
64. E.g., In re Lydia Hall Hospital, 116 Misc.2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982). Even with treatment directives such as living wills, interpretation issues may
arise. See, R. Steinbeck & B. Lo, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients by Desig-
nated Proxy, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1598 (1984).
65. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. The New Jersey Supreme Court later
realized it was wrong not to consider such statements. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209.
66. For those who distrust family decision making because it may involve unarticu-
lated, intuitive thinking, consider Cardozo's observation about the process of judicial de-
cision making: "Much of the process has been unconscious or nearly so. The ends to
which courts have addressed themselves, the reasons and motives that have guided them,
have often been vaguely felt, intuitively or almost intuitively apprehended, seldom ex-
plicitly avowed." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 117 (1921).
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inaccessible and slow, and doctors are too busy to spend time
inquiring into the patient's life, philosophy, and value prefer-
ences. 7 Only the family, immersed in and constantly thinking
about its fateful decision, will devote the necessary time and
possess the necessary information about the patient. With the
medical data provided by attending doctors, they are uniquely
placed to make treatment/nontreatment decisions.
Family knowledge is also an important element in decision-
making for patients who were never competent prior to their ill-
ness, but in a somewhat different way. The never-competent pa-
tient, such as the severely mentally retarded individuals in the
Storar5 and Saikewicze9 litigations, never, had the ability to
form the value preferences which treatment/nontreatment deci-
sions require. 70
Knowledge about the patient nevertheless comes into play
as a vital element in decisionmaking on his behalf. It is a differ-
ent kind of knowledge, however, a knowledge of the patient's
feelings, and of the way he experiences events. Certain treat-
ments, for example, may engender feelings of fear, isolation, or
disorientation. They may involve pain and discomfort, or require
physical restraint and handling by others. How one experiences
these things is unique, varying from person to person. A signifi-
cant bodily invasion may not terribly bother one person, while a
lesser invasion may be extremely distressing to another. This is
true for competent patients as well as incompetent ones, and it
is why knowledge about the particular individual, even the
never-competent one, is so vital. Family members, assuming of
67. For further discussion see infra notes 102 to 114 (doctors) and 188 to 196
(courts).
68. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266.
69. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417.
70. Because of this, the "substituted judgment" test enunciated in Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 is impossible to carry out. The court noted "the decision in
cases such as this should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if
that person were competent .... " Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. The test, as applied to
persons who never were competent, misconstrues the nature of decisionmaking itself.
When several options exist, each plausibly supportable, with its own risks, benefits, and
burdens, then personal value preferences must exist to determine what the particular
individual would want done. The individual who, like Mr. Saikewicz, could not compre-
hend the very notion of death could not form any values about adopting a course of
nontreatment that might shorten his life.
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course that they are involved with the patient,71 are best placed
to witness and understand what their never-competent relative
is feeling and experiencing. The family's conclusions, particu-
larly about the relative burdens of treatment/nontreatment op-
tions, are therefore of great significance.72
Fundamental societal values also support making the family
the primary decisionmaker in treatment/nontreatment decisions
for incompetent, critically ill persons. The family is from time to
time proclaimed to be the foundation on which society is built. 7
Whether it is or not, it is certainly our most enduring, funda-
mental social unit, with profound meaning and significance to
the individual and to society. 4
The family has been a resilient, hardy institution surviving
through and adjusting to a variety of social, political and eco-
nomic upheavals. It has been recognized in law in numerous
ways as a basis for personal and property rights and obligations.
Fundamental constitutional rights spring from the value placed
on the intimate relationships of family life.75 Under the Consti-
tution there exists a "private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.
'7 6
These legal doctrines reflect the fact that we view family
self-governance as a highly prized value in American life. Its
protected status under the Due Process Clause evidences con-
cern that majorities not regulate family decisionmaking in its
most intimate and sensitive functions. Responding to a severely
incapacitating, irreversible illness of a member of the family unit
is one of these functions. The impending death, permanent loss
of consciousness, or near-complete mental and physical incapaci-
71. In Saikewicz, two sisters were informed of his condition and of the hearing "but
they preferred not to attend or otherwise become involved." Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at
420.
72. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 53, 355 A.2d 647, 664.
73. See, e.g., Maynard v, Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
74. "Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the
instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as well as from
the fact of blood relationship." Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
75. "[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
76. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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tation of a parent, spouse, or child is one of the most emotion-
ally intense experiences of family life. Dealing with such events
requires family members to gather their emotional strength, to
seek solace from trusted intimates, and to bring their personal
moral, philosophical or religious convictions to bear for guidance
and comfort. By necessity, the experience must be shared with
the strangers7" who render care for the ill, but it is one that is
otherwise entitled to a respectful and decent privacy.
It might be argued that the value of family privacy and
automony must give way to some individual right of the family
member, in the context of decisionmaking that may have the ef-
fect of shortening the individual's life.7 8 But in the case of in-
competent patients, their individual right to decide must be ex-
ercised by someone else, and to look to the individual's own
network of intimate human connection is the most compelling
alternative open to us. A law that focuses only on the individual,
viewing him as a lone, solitary being, fails to recognize a vital
aspect of living. When individuals living in a mass society are
fortunate enough to be part of a small, supportive human com-
munity, the law should promote and respect that community.
A final basic value that lends support to family decision-
making is our culturally shared moral principle that those who
bear the burdens of a decision have a major claim to making it.79
In reporting on decisionmaking at the Yale-New Haven Hospi-
tal, in the tragic situations presented by severely malformed and
impaired infants, physicians Raymond Duff and A.G.M. Camp-
bell wrote:80
Since families primarily must live with and are most
affected by the decisions, it therefore appears that soci-
ety and the health professions should provide only gen-
eral guidelines for decision making. Moreover, since vari-
ations between situations are so great, and the situations
77. With the disappearance of the family doctor, and the advent of medical special-
ists and health care teams composed of technicians, nurses, and hospital staff interns
and residents, it can be said that caregivers nowadays are frequently "strangers."
78. Nesbitt, Terminating Life Support for Mentally Retarded, Critically Ill Pa-
tients, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 245, 263-64 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nesbitt].
79. GOROVITZ, supra note 2, ch. 13.
80. Duff and Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery,
289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Moral and Ethical Dilemmas].
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themselves so complex, it follows that much latitude in
decision making should be expected and tolerated. Other-
wise, the rules of society or the policies most convenient
for medical technologists may become cruel masters of
human beings instead of their servants."
In sum, selecting the family as primary decisionmaker recognizes
its unique knowledge and involvement, its preferred status in
American legal and medical tradition, and its rightful claims to
privacy and self-governance in its most intimate and difficult
functions.
Difficulties in Family Decisionmaking
Choosing the family as decisionmaker is not without its dif-
ficulties. Family members are subject to conflicting emotions.
They may feel guilt if they don't ask doctors to "do everything
possible." Their own need for the patient's survival may lead
them to urge inappropriate treatment.82 Deciding to withdraw
treatment, even when that seems the most reasonable course,
might be too emotionally traumatizing to the family.8" As one
observer put it, "Families [may look] for miracles instead of
death. '' 84 Alternatively, family members may become weary with
the prolonged illness of the patient, and consciously or not, wish
for the relief that death would bring.8 5 Chronic critical illness
can place substantial psychological, emotional and financial bur-
dens upon family members and may cause physical stress and
exhaustion as well.86
These emotional difficulties are part of the familial experi-
ence of sickness and death. They are not sufficient to disqualify
the family from decisionmaking for several reasons. First, they
can be dealt with, often with the help of doctors and nurses at-
tending the patient. Some doctors attempt to allay the guilt feel-
ings of the family by taking the initiative in suggesting treat-
ment termination, and allowing the family, if it wishes, to
81. Id. at 894.
82. Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49, at 464.
83. D. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 158.
84. R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNEss AND SociETY 319 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as DUFF & HOLLINGSHEAD].
85. D. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 158.
86. DUFF & HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 84, at 377-78; Ferber, supra note 35.
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perceive the decision as one in which they acquiesced, rather
than one which they actively demanded. 87 As to the need for re-
lief that death might bring, it is likely to be consciously fought
against and to be counteracted by the need to hold onto the
family member. In practice, there appears to be no evidence that
patients are being denied treatment prematurely. 8
The emotional involvement with the patient that close fam-
ily members feel can play a positive, even essential role in deci-
sionmaking for the incompetent patient. Gorovitz, in his book
Doctor's Dilemmas, stresses the importance to the decisionmak-
ing process of having an emotional understanding of the illness
and its effects.89 He describes a discussion among medical stu-
dents concerning treatment and nontreatment options for a 3-
year old child in a vegetative coma. 0 The discussion changes
markedly in tone and character after the students actually see
the patient whose treatment they are talking about. Gorovitz re-
ports the "shallowness of discussion that is wholly detached
from emotional impact and the attendant stresses of the situa-
tion in question."" Of course, the emotional shock of sudden or
tragic medical developments can impair decisionmaking, as
Gorovitz notes.2 But even if initially overcome with paralyzing
grief, people have means of marshaling their decisionmaking re-
sources." At that point, their emotional involvement is not the
enemy of reason, but an essential adjunct to it. Emotional reac-
tions lead us to the knowledge of what is important in the
human scale of values. Sensitivity, empathy, and compassion in-
spire a more profound understanding of the patient's situation,
and are as essential to this type of decisionmaking as is "pure"
rational thinking. Family members bring these critical emotional
elements into their considerations.
87. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 80, at 891; D. WALTON, supra note 51,
at 214-15 (1983).
88. Accounts in scholarly journals and in the press indicate that overly aggressive
treatment is the true problem. See articles supra notes 3, 35, 36, 37. Dr. Ronald
Cranford, a nationally recognized expert in this area, has said that "overtreatment is
rampant in hospitals." INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION
MAKING 233 (Cranford and Doudera eds. 1984).
89. GOROVITZ, supra note 2, at 197.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See articles cited supra note 35.
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Another problem presented by families is the potential for
stalemate. Disagreement is a complication which inevitably ex-
ists when a unit composed of more than one individual is recog-
nized as decisionmaker. But the family unit is one which regu-
larly functions with some degree of discord, and it usually
develops some mode of dealing with it. It is thus quite possible
for the family to be substituted for the incompetent patient, and
to reach decisions. Disagreement may not exist, or it may be re-
solved by some other family practice. As an example, consider
one family, known to the author, faced with the question of
whether to continue the wife/mother on a mechanical respirator.
The adult children disagreed among themselves about discon-
nection, with most favoring it. The husband/father opposed dis-
connection. The "family decision" was to continue the mechani-
cal support, based not on complete agreement, but on deference
to the wishes of the husband/father. The irreversibly comatose
patient received respirator support for a year and a half before
she died in the coma.
Some commentators cite a potential conflict of interest aris-
ing from family members' stake in the inheritance they will re-
ceive from their ill relative.9 In the literature, however, it is sig-
nificant to note that this concern is never documented with
actual examples. The conflict of interest seems more theoretical
than real, a problem more common to mystery novels and televi-
sion dramas than to real life experience.
Another objection to family decisionmaking is the difficulty
of identifying who is "the family." The New York Court of Ap-
peals complained that "family" was an unbounded "open-en-
ded" concept that reaches "to the limits of the family tree"95 as
if this posed a major obstacle in most cases. One way to identify
the pertinent individuals is to specify them by their relationship
to the patient. The Virginia statute on withdrawing life support
for the terminally ill, for example, lists a patient's spouse, adult
children, and parents (in that order of priority) as surrogate
decisionmakers, with a catchall phrase "the nearest living rela-
tive" as a last resort.9 6
94. D. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 158.
95. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370, n.2, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67, n.2, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
269, n.2.
96. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (1985 Supp.). The code gives highest priority to a judicially
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Another method is to leave the term "family" as the identi-
fying term, without specific elaboration. There is nothing in the
medical literature indicating that it is difficult to identify family
members, and AMA guidelines use the term "family," appar-
ently believing further elaboration to be unnecessary.9 7 In the
usual hospital settings, concerned family members identify
themselves and are routinely involved with physicians, nurses,
and the patient. Of course, if close relatives refuse to be in-
volved, then they should not be decisionmakers, and if non-rela-
tives who are close intimates of the patient wish to be involved,
they should be. It is possible, of course, that in some instances
some line-drawing will have to be done, but this does not arise in
the generality of cases and when it does, a court proceeding to
name a guardian for decisionmaking for the patient will take
care of the problem.
Another possible objection to family decisionmaking in this
area is that the family may take its own self-interests into ac-
count. I do not believe this is a valid criticism, so long as the
family has genuine concern for the welfare of the patient. A fam-
ily may be subject to crushing burdens when catastrophic illness
strikes one of its members. The illness may be a source of great
torment and place great stress on the functioning of the family,.
even to the point of endangering its own viability as a unit.98
Hospital bills may threaten financial ruin for the remaining
members. The expenses associated with intensive care and high
technology medicine are notoriously high, and not all is covered
by the current patchwork system of health insurance.9 Such
burdens on the family are not wholly irrelevant to decisionmak-
appointed guardian if one exists, and to any person specifically designated in writing by
the patient.
97. See AMA statement quoted supra text accompanying note 53.
98. See supra, note 80. Duff and Campbell noted the extensive damage done to some
families where the severe illness was suffered by newborns. 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. at 891,
892. (1973). Families of older patients may also be shattered by the experience. Malcolm,
For Doctors and Patients, Decisions on Death, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, § 1, at 1.
99. The President's Commission estimated that 16% of Americans have no health
insurance at all. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 92-
93 (1983). The court in In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 467 n.1, 380 N.E.2d 134,
135 n.1, noted that Medicare stops payment for custodial care of incurable victims of
Alzheimer's disease.
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ing, because (1) the patient himself would, if competent, be
likely to care about the welfare of the family, (2) the family wel-
fare is entitled to some concern also, for its own sake, as long as
the patient's interests are of primary concern and (3) all deci-
sionmakers in fact take such matters into account as unavoida-
ble aspects of the entire tragic event unfolding before them.
Courts, physicians and family, for example, think about the
enormous costs of high technology treatments.100 If financial
costs cannot be openly discussed and considered, they will then
become a "hidden" element that nevertheless has its
influence. 1 1
Objections to a general rule of family decisionmaking must
be considered not only on their own, but in comparison to objec-
tions to alternate decisionmakers such as physicians and courts.
The following sections will discuss the appropriate roles of both
doctors and courts in the process of decisionmaking for incom-
petent, critically ill persons.
THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN
Current Practices
In formulating the appropriate role for the physician in
treatment/nontreatment decisions, it is important to examine
some of the current characteristics of medical practice. Much of
the study of physician practice focuses on the doctor-patient re-
lationship. When patients are incompetent, however, it appears
that doctors deal with families in much the same way as they do
with competent patients.10 2
Doctors are essential to the treatment decisionmaking pro-
cess, since they have vital information on which any decision
100. See, e.g., Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 2, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810
(notes $500/day cost involved in maintaining hopeless patient); Wanzer supra note 145,
at 957 (physicians state, "financial ruin of the patient's family ... should be weighed in
the decision-making process, although the patient's welfare obviously remains para-
mount"); Walter, supra note 35, at 22 (father's hospital bill of $47,795 for 37 days at-
tached to respirator against daughter's wishes; additional doctor bills exceed $14,000);
Malcolm, Family Seeks a Mercy Death Accord, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1985, sec. 1, at 20,
col. 1. (hospital care for man in a permanent vegetative state costs $150,000 a year).
101. Kleiman, Changing Way of Death: Some Agonizing Choices, N.Y. Times, Jan.
14, 1985, sec. 1, at 1, col. 1.
102. See Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49.
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must be based. For anyone else to participate in decisionmaking
(including patients themselves), doctors must share their knowl-
edge. To the extent they refuse to do so, they ensure that they
will control the decisionmaking process. Many common practices
in current medical care combine to place just such control in the
doctors' hands. In particular, the brevity of doctor-patient or
doctor-family interactions, the limited information that doctors
convey, the way they present information, and the practice of
masking the uncertainties of medical diagnosis, of choice of
treatment, and of prognosis, tend to leave patients and families
with little, if any, opportunity to make decisions.
In theory, competent patients are entitled to make their
own health care choices under the informed consent doctrine.'01
Medical practice, however, has transformed the notion of in-
formed consent into a brief and sparse exchange that fails to
transmit much vital information. A study incorporated into the
Presidential Commission's report revealed that hospital pa-
tients, when they are competent, are usually not told anything
about tests and procedures which physicians consider "rou-
tine.' 10 4 Patients are often not told when various tests have been
ordered, what the tests involve, or even what they are for. The
same information vacuum exists for medications prescribed,
drawing of blood, x-rays, and other matters that are "routine"
for the professional though not for the patient. 0 5
When physicians do communciate with patients and fami-
lies, they see the exchange as one whose primary function is to
convey the decision the physician has already made concerning
treatment. 0° These communications are marked by a brevity
which devalues the importance of discussion and deprives the
patient and family of a significant role in decisionmaking. 10 7 Use
of medical jargon often further limits the layperson's ability to
103. See Miller, Informed Consent: 1, 244 J. A.M.A. 2100 (1980).
104. Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49, at 393.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 399-400.
107. See KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter cited
as KATZ]. Critically ill patients and their families need time for discussion, not only to
make informed decisions, but to feel supported in their struggle and to exercise some
control over their disrupted and disorganized lives. Cassileth, Care of the Terminally Ill
Patient and Family, DEL. MED. J. 482 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Cassileth].
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extract useful information from the brief visit.108 Doctors sched-
ule themselves to see many patients quickly, and allot little time
for discussion with any of them. 109 This lack of time helps to
structure the physician-patient-family interchange as a one-way,
take-it-or-leave-it recommendation. All too often, after discus-
sion with the doctor, a patient and his family remain unedu-
cated about such vital matters as treatment alternatives which
exist, their relative risks and benefits, their potential negative
side effects, the nature of the treatment procedure chosen, and
expectations about pain the treatment may cause."10
Another matter that is usually never fully disclosed, despite
its importance, is medical uncertainty. The treatment recom-
mendation offered by the physician is often made with bland
reassurances, confidence, and certainty, despite the lack of cer-
tainty that may exist in either the physician's own mind or
within the profession generally."' The air of certainty commonly
adopted is rationalized as therapeutic for the patient, but in fact
it may more often be explained as a way physicians deny, relieve
or hide their own anxieties, and as a product of medical training
that inappropriately disregards uncertainty."' The discomfort
caused by uncertainty may be a source of stress and conflict
among caregivers, and may lead doctors to make hasty decisions
which don't take the true uncertainty of the patient's condition
into account."' As for patients, pat reassurances make many
"feel disregarded, ignored, patronized and dismissed.' 1 4
Instead of talking with patients and families, some doctors
rely upon "tacit" understandings or assumed knowledge of their
patients." 5 Topics which doctors feel are difficult to dis-
cuss-such as whether a "Do Not Resuscitate" order should be
108. Corless, Physicians and Nurses: Roles and Responsibilities in Caring for the
Critically Ill Patient, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 271-72.
109. Id. See also Kassirer, Adding Insult to Injury: Usurping Patients' Prerogatives,
308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 898, 900 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kassirer].
110. Lidz and Meisel, supra note 49.
111. KATZ, supra note 107, at 165-206.
112. Id. at 184-88, 225.
113. Cassem, Consulation to Continue or Stop Treatment Measures in Irreversible
Illness, 10 ADVAN. PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 119, 127 (1980).
114. KATZ, supra note 107, at 210. See also Gold, supra note 51, at 20.
115. E.g., Van Scoy-Mosher, An Oncologist's Case for No-Code Orders, in LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS supra note 10, at 16-17; Levine, Disconnection: The Clinician's View,
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11 (Feb. 1976).
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issued-are simply skipped over entirely. A study done at a
prestigious university teaching hospital found that most physi-
cians, including those who said they believed in talking with pa-
tients about their desires concerning resuscitation, did not in
fact discuss the issue with patients or their families.11 Patients,
interestingly, did not find the issue too difficult to discuss with
the researchers, and the study found that doctors' assumptions
about what patients wanted was often incorrect. 1 7 The result, of
course, was to infringe upon the right of the patient to make his
own decisions.
A more subtle undermining of patient autonomy also tran-
spires in the doctor-patient relationship. In addition to depriv-
ing patients of information necessary to intelligent decision
making, many physicians deprive them of the self-confidence
needed to make important decisions. This occurs when physi-
cians act as if 1) the patient is incapable of understanding any-
thing medical, and 2) the patient is acting appropriately in re-
garding the doctor as an omnipotent authority figure. The latter
is a commonplace, irrational fantasy for very ill persons, a child-
like wish to have someone take care of them and make every-
thing come out all right. In psychological terms, this might be
called an infantile transference phenomenon.1 8 Physicians may
rationalize their dominating stance with patients by saying that
it is what the patients themselves want, referring to this irra-
tional transference effect. But co-existing with irrational wishes
are patients' other thoughts and desires, in particular, the desire
to know what is wrong with them, and the desire to "control
their own lives during illness just as they do during health."'1 9
Physicians could tailor their behavior to reinforce and encourage
this set of desires in their patients, instead of the more infantile,
less rational desires. Their contrary behavior may reflect more
on their own unconscious needs (e.g. the narcissistic desire to
take power, to act the hero or to fight Death) than on the true
116. Bedell & Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hos-
pital-When Do Physicians Talk with Patients? 310 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1089 (1984).
117. Id. at 1091. This was particularly true for patients who did not want resuscita-
tion. Eight patients told researchers they opposed resuscitation. Of the sixteen doctors
involved with the care of these patients, only one accurately assessed the patients'
desires.
118. KATZ, supra note 107, at 211-12.
119. Id. at 209.
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needs and desires of most patients. 1 0
Some physicians do practice medicine in such a way as to
make patients and families truly informed decision making
agents. Dr. Jerome Kassirer, in an article entitled Adding Insult
To Injury: Usurping Patients' Prerogatives, advises his col-
leagues to "set aside their image of themselves as making life-
and-death decisions alone and undertake instead the less glam-
orous and more time-consuming process of exploring options
and outcomes with the patient.""12 Nevertheless, Kassirer sees
physician-imposed decisions as widespread.1 22 The tradition of
paternalism and professional dominance is still very much alive
in the medical profession.
Criticism of Physician Practices
When doctors provide little or no information on treatment
options, they maintain excessive control over decisionmaking. 28
This is objectionable because treatment decisions for the se-
verely, hopelessly ill turn not merely on medical data but on
moral and ethical values."' The value to a dying or severely ill
patient of aggressive medical treatment is a matter of personal
judgment. For human beings, health is an important value, but
it is one among many values, and it is not always the most im-
portant one. The case of Rosaria Candura, a 77-year old woman
who refused a medically-indicated operation to amputate her leg
illustrates this point. '25 Although doctors tried to persuade her
to undergo the operation, without which she risked dying, and
her daughter sought a court order to declare her incompetent,
the patient had her own non-medical reasons for refusing the
120. Id. at 15, 131-41, 148-49.
121. Kassirer concludes: "The sick suffer enough. We must avoid adding insult to
injury by denying them a proper role in determining their future." Kassirer, supra note
109, at 900-901.
122. Id.
123. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 80, at 894; Hilfiker, Allowing the De-
bilitated to Die: Facing Our Ethical Choices, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 716 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Hilfiker]. "
124. D. WALTON, supra note 51, at 174, D. MAGUIRE, supra note 30 at 150, VEATCH,
DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1976); McNeil, Weichselbaum, &
Pauker, Speech and Survival: Tradeoffs between Quality and Quantity of Life in La-
ryngeal Cancer, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 982 (1981).
125. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
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treatment.126 These reasons, as described by the court, were that
"she has been unhappy since the death of her husband, that she
does not wish to be a burden to her children, that she does not
believe that the operation will cure her, that she does not wish
to live as an invalid or in a nursing home, and that she does not
fear death but welcomes it."'27 The court refused to conclude
that her thinking demonstrated her incompetence to make her
own decision, and held that she had the right to refuse the rec-
ommended treatment. 12 8
Mrs. Candura did not choose to maximize health values, in
the face of other values which were more important to her. Even
when health values are most important, there may be room for
value choices. Consider the alternatives of surgery and radiation
therapy posed by some cases of lung cancer. As of 1978, surgery
offered a better chance for five year survival than did radiation,
but surgery was associated with some risk of peri-operative mor-
tality.129 Doctors generally favored taking the risk of surgery to
increase the odds of greater longevity. But when patients' atti-
tudes were studied, medical researchers found that some were
much more risk-averse than doctors, i.e., there were patients
who did not want to take the risk of early death posed by sur-
gery, preferring instead the prospect of assured life for at least a
few months. The researchers, all physicians, concluded that:
[T]he highly risk-averse patients should receive radiation
therapy, which has no associated operative mortality,
rather than surgical extirpation, which has an operative
mortality, even though surgical therapy appears signifi-
cantly better on the basis of five-year-survival data. This
analysis is based on the premise that it is the patients'
own attitudes that should prevail because, after all, it is
the patient who suffers the risks and achieves the gains.
However, in contemporary medicine the attitudes most
frequently used are those of physicians; doctors are gen-
erally more risk seeking than patients, perhaps because
126. Id. at 378, 376 N.E.2d at 1234.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 379, 376 N.E.2d at 1236.
129. B. McNeil, R. Weichselbaum, and S. Pauker, Fallacy of the Five-Year Survival
in Lung Cancer 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1397 (1978).
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of age and perhaps because the consequences of the deci-
sion may be felt less immediately by them than by the
patient. " '
In this situation, physicians who recommend surgery and neglect
to discuss radiation as an alternative are clearly allowing their
own values to supersede those of the patient.
When physicians inject their own values into decisionmak-
ing for others, they may feel they are acting out of purely altru-
istic motives. This is the justification generally offered in de-
fense of medical paternalism.3 1 What must not be overlooked,
however, is that physicians' values are shaped not only by altru-
ism, but also at times by self-interest, by professional bias, and
by personal needs, all of which may be at odds with the best
interests of the patient.
Professional bias in medical decisionmaking for the criti-
cally ill takes many forms. Some doctors believe death is the en-
emy of professional medicine, and that it must always be fought
aggressively, lest the physician feel a sense of failure or defeat. " 2
This attitude fosters a dehumanized, "machine medicine"
mentality, which supplants sensitive and humane care for the
severely ill.' 3 Some doctors favor medical technology simply
"because it is there.'' 4 Young doctors may rely upon technology
to hide their inexperience.3 5 Others may opt for aggressive
treatment because the patient offers the physician a chance to
hone his skills. A medical administrator observes that "many
physicians feel that they are not fully actualized in their practice
if [they are] not using the complete complement of technological
tools at their disposal." 36 Along the same lines, Gorovitz notes
130. Id. Professor Katz also concludes that physicians value the highest statistical
chance of longevity above all else, and won't let patients decide for other values. KATZ,
supra note 107, at 97.
131. Id. at 89.
132. • GoRovITz, supra note 2, at 20; Brooks, Withholding Treatment and Orders Not
to Resuscitate in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 105; Hanratty, Care of
the Dying Patient, 103 J. ROYAL Soc. HEALTH 1 (1983).
133. Lewis, supra note 37.
134. Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 115, at 16.
135. N. COUSINS, THE HEALING HEART: ANTIDOTES TO PANIC AND HELPLESSNESS (1984).
136. S. Weiss, The Health Care Team: Changing Perceptions of Roles and Responsi-
bilities in Caring for the Critically Ill Patient, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra
note 10, at 264.
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that doctors with state-of-the-art skills want to use them, and
may derive aesthetic satisfaction when they do.' He reports the
case of a doctor practicing certain medical procedures on a co-
matose patient, who could not be expected to benefit from the
procedures and whose family would get the bill for them.'
Other such accounts exist, e.g., of a hospital resident permitting
a new intern to repeatedly resuscitate a dying infant, in order to
let the intern practice his skills."3 9
A variety of personal, professional and institutional inter-
ests may affect decisionmaking by physicians, including research
agendas, personal views on ethics, and professional training op-
portunities. Consider this account by Duff and Campbell of rea-
sons physicians in a university teaching hospital's intensive care
nursery gave for aggressively treating severely defective
newborns:
There was a feeling that to "give up" was disloyal to the
cause of the profession. Since major research, teaching
and patient-care efforts were being made, professionals
expected to discover, transmit and apply knowledge and
skills; patients and families were supposed to co-operate
fully even if they were not always grateful. Some physi-
cians recognized that the wishes of families went against
their own, but they were resolute. They commonly agreed
that if they were the parents of very defective children,
withholding treatment would be most desirable for them.
However, they argued that aggressive management was
indicated for others. Some believed that allowing death
as a management option was euthanasia and must be
stopped for fear of setting a "poor ethical example" or for
fear of personal prosecution or damage to their clinical
departments or to the medical center as a whole. Alexan-
der's report on Nazi Germany was cited in some cases as
providing justification for pressing the effort to combat
disease. Some persons were concerned about the loss
through death of "teaching material." They feared the
137. GOROVITZ, supra note 2, at 17, 21-22.
138. Id.
139. Towers, Ethical and Legal Responsibilities of the Physician Toward the Dying
Newborn, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 234.
[Vol. III
TREATMENT REFUSALS
training of professionals for the care of defective children
in the future and the advancing of the state of the art
would be compromised. Some parents who became aware
of this concern thought their children should not become
experimental subjects.140
As this excerpt shows, the bias toward research and experimen-
tal medicine in teaching hospitals sometimes introduces a con-
flict of interest that goes totally unrecognized by doctors. In
such environments, the sick person may be seen as "a datum
among data,"' rather than as an individual entitled to respect-
ful care.
The need to cover mistakes also surfaces in physician be-
havior. Duff and Hollingshead, investigating general medical
practice at a university teaching hospital, report: "When a phy-
sician made a mistake in diagnosing a patient's illness he faced a
question, perhaps a fatal one for the patient, of importance to
his self-respect and for his practice: Should he tell the patient
and the patient's family the truth, or should he evade the issue
and bluff his way through to the end?" 42 Human nature being
what it is, some doctors choose to evade and bluff. s Others
aware of physician mistakes may also have self-interests to pro-
tect. Winslow reports the experience of a nurse "present when a
surgical resident botched a tracheotomy and severed the pa-
tient's carotid artery. The patient bled to death. The nurse de-
cided that for the sake of other patients she should report the
resident. But the medical director cautioned the nurse not to
pursue the matter unless she hired an attorney. As the nurse put
it: 'Dr. X kills the patient and I need a lawyer.' ,,"4
Another element of self-interest that affects doctors in mak-
ing treatment decisions is the fear of legal liability. This "often
interferes with the physician's ability to make the best choice for
the patient," writes a group of prominent physicians from the
140. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 80, at 892.
141. The phrase is from D. MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 152 (2d ed. 1984). See gener-
ally J. KATZ AND A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? (1975).
142. R. DUFF AND A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY 314 (1968)..
143. Id.
144. Winslow, From Loyalty to Advocacy: A New Metaphor for Nursing, HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 32, 38 (June, 1984).
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nation's leading hospitals and medical schools.145 An example is
described by an oncologist who issued a "no-code" order (an or-
der not to resuscitate in case of cardio-respiratory failure) on a
patient.14" A surgeon involved with the care of the patient, fear-
ing liability, cancelled the order during his hospital rounds.1 47
Thus it happened that the no-code order was issued every morn-
ing and cancelled every afternoon.14 8 By chance, the patient died
while the no-code order was in effect.1 49 In fairness, it should be
noted that hospital lawyers contribute to physicians' liability
fears, by exaggerating legal risks and offering advice that mini-
mizes such risks without concern for the benefit and humane
care of the patient. 50
Finally, it is important to recognize that medicine, like
other occupations, fulfills the personal needs of those who
choose it as their work, and those needs can motivate, some-
times unconsciously, medical behavior. Katz speaks of the need
of many physicians to feel dominant and in control.' They re-
fuse to treat laypersons as adults, and insist on relationships
with patients that resemble parent-child relations. 52 Others see
in medical training the fulfillment of a need to "command all
situations. 1 5 Doctors react to patients not only rationally but
emotionally. Their unconscious reactions may cause them to
make errors in diagnosis,1 54 to undermedicate patients in severe
pain, 155 and to withdraw from patients whom they cannot save
but who still need their attention and support."' Further, they
are at the top of the socio-economic ladder, and they may feel
145. Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig &
Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 955, 957 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Wanzer].
146. Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 115, at 16.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Termi-
nally Ill Incompetent, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 40-41; Wanzer,
supra note 145, at 956.
151. KATZ, supra note 107, at 148-49.
152. Id. at 142-46.
153. Towers, supra note 139, at 234.
154. Dinsdale, Delays and Slips in Medical Diagnosis, 27 PERSP. IN BIOL. & MED. 213
(1984).
155. See Perry, supra note 33; Angel, supra note 33.
156. Cassileth, supra note 107, at 483; Gold, supra note 51.
[Vol. III
TREATMENT REFUSALS
uncomfortable with, or even disdainful of those from a different
social class, and these feelings too may affect their medical
judgments. 57 .
Of course, not all physicians exhibit all the self-interested
behaviors discussed above. But it would be wrong to assume
physicians act only out of altruistic motives in their medical
practice. There is a constant tension in medical practice between
altruism and self-interest. 5 8 When values come into play in
medical treatment decisions, as they inevitably do, the physi-
cian's choices should not be assumed to be superior to those of
the patient or the patient's family.
Suggested Role of the Physician
The proper role for the physician is broad enough, even
without ultimate decisionmaking authority. The key components
of an appropriate role for the physician are delineated below.
1. Application of medical skills and judgment
Medicine is still an art as well as a science. Great skill and
wise judgment are required in making an accurate diagnosis, in
reducing pain, in ascertaining the level of cognitive, sensory and
emotional functioning the patient is experiencing, and in pre-
dicting the future course of an illness. The complexities multiply
* when, as is common, the patient suffers from a variety of physi-
cal ailments, somatic changes must be followed and assessed,
and the physician must identify the risks and benefits of multi-
ple treatment possibilities. The uncertainties that pervade medi-
cal practice increase the stress on doctors in performing these
tasks, as do unrealistic expectations and demands of patients
and families. The doctor's judgment and medical skill necessa-
rily remains a key part of any decisionmaking scheme.
2. Communication of information
Doctors usually share their knowledge of the patient's diag-
nosis, level of functioning, and prognosis with the family. In ad-
157. Eisenberg, Sociologic Influences on Decision-Making by Clinicians, 90 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 957 (1979); DUFF & HOLLINGSHEAD, supra note 84, at 118-19, 126-27,
133, 366-67.
158. Jonsen, Watching the Doctor, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1531 (1983).
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dition, they must become accustomed to sharing (1) their knowl-
edge of treatment and nontreatment options available, with the
potential risks, burdens, and benefits attendant upon each, and
(2) their uncertainty, if it exists, about all of these matters.
The law's vision of informed consent, which has been al-
lowed to atrophy in practice," 9 needs revitalization. To breathe
new life into it, three steps need to be taken. The first is to iden-
tify the disclosures that are required by reference to the pa-
tient's (or family's) needs, rather than to the standards and
norms of the medical profession. The latter became the basis of
disclosure in the early formulation of the doctrine' but, since
the 1970's several states have adopted a "patient needs" ap-
proach. 6' The second step is to require disclosure of all treat-
ment options, not just the single option recommended by the
doctor. Some courts are now requiring this expanded form of
disclosure, but many do not.6 2
The third necessary step is to include the notion of "in-
formed refusal" in the informed consent doctrine. This is partic-
ularly important when patients are critically, irreversibly ill, be-
cause not accepting treatment often becomes a reasonable
option. Further, if death is expected, families may want to ac-
cept some treatments and reject others, in order to choose what
one thoughtful observer, M. Pabst Battin, calls "the least worst
death." s63 Professor Battin explains:
[I]n almost any terminal condition, death can occur in
various ways, and there are many possible outcomes of
the patient's present condition. The patient who is dying
of emphysema could die of respiratory failure, but could
also die of cardiac arrest or untreated pulmonary infec-
159. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 15 at 105-06; KATZ, supra note 107, at 82-
84.
160. Nathanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); DiFilippo v. Preston,
173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961). See Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents:
From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NE.. L. REv. 51
(1977).
161. E.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See discussion of these two standards in
Miller, Informed Consent: I, 244 J. A.M.A. 2100 (1980).
162. Cases on both sides of the issue are collected in Annot., 38 A.L.R. 4th 900 (1985).
163. Battin, The Least Worst Death, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 13 (April 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Battin].
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tion. The patient who is suffering from bowel cancer
could die of peritonitis following rupture of the bowel,,
but could also die of dehydration, of pulmonary infec-
tion, of acid-base imbalance, of electrolyte deficiency, or
of an arrhythmia. . . . Infection and cancer, for instance,
are old friends; there is increased frequency of infection
in the immuno-compromised host. Other secondary con-
ditions, like dehydration or metabolic derangement, may
set in. Of course certain conditions typically occur a little
earlier, others a little later, in the ordinary course of a
terminal disease, and some are a matter of chance. The
critical point is that certain conditions will produce a
death that is more comfortable, more decent, more pre-
dictable, and more permitting of conscious and peaceful
experience than others. Some are better, if the patient
has to die at all, and some are worse. Which mode of
death claims the patient depends in part on circumstance
and in part on the physician's response to conditions that-
occur.. . . But though it is crucial in making a genuinely
informed decision, the patient's right to information
about the risks and outcomes of alternative kinds of re-
fusal has not yet been recognized. So, for instance, in or-
der to make a genuinely informed choice, the bowel can-
cer patient with concomitant infection will need to know
about the outcomes of each of the principal options: ac-
cepting both bowel surgery and antibiotics; accepting an-
tibiotics but not surgery; accepting surgery but not an-
tibiotics; or accepting neither. The case may of course be
more complex, but the principle remains: To recognize
the patients's right to autonomous choice in matters con-
cerning the treatment of his own body, the physician
must provide information about all the legal options open
to him, not just information sufficient to choose between
accepting or rejecting a single proposed procedure.""
When the patient is unable to make decisions for himself, the
family should receive the necessary information about all treat-
ment/nontreatment alternatives.'6 5
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. See supra, text accompanying notes 47-81.
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Some courts have adopted the notion that the refusal of
treatment should be as informed as the consent to treatment. In
Truman v. Thomas,166 the California Supreme Court considered
the case of a physician who failed to warn a woman of the risks
involved in refusing a pap smear. 67 The Court ruled that the
physician could be held liable when, lacking the appropriate in-
formation, the woman refused the diagnostic procedure, and
later died of cervical cancer.'" A New York court ruled similarly
in the case of a woman whose doctor recommended surgery for
what he told his patient was a "pinched nerve" in her right
foot.'" 9 The doctor did not tell her that he didn't know what was
causing the pinched nerve.'7 0 The woman refused the surgery,
and later had to have her leg partially amputated when it was
discovered that a malignant tumor was causing the foot prob-
lem.' 7'1 The court ruled a jury could properly find the defendant
doctor negligent for failing to advise her that a tumor might be
present and that surgery was needed to find out for sure. 17 ' It is
worth noting that here the doctor failed to disclose his uncer-
tainty about the patient's condition. The case demonstrates the
importance of sharing medical uncertainties as well as medical
knowledge possessed by physicians.
One case makes clear, in the context of a critically ill person
with a short life expectancy, that informed refusal is a part of
the doctrine of informed consent. This is the case of In re Con-
roy,' 7  in which an 84-year old woman suffered from multiple
severe disorders and exhibited only minimal cognitive, sensory,
or emotional functioning.'"' The court, in considering whether
artificial means of feeding and hydration had to be continued,
stated:
The doctrine of informed consent presupposes that the
patient has the information necessary to evaluate the
166. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Crisher v. Spak, 122 Misc.2d 355, 471 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1983).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209.
174. Id. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222.
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risks and benefits of all the available options .... The
patient's ability to control his bodily integrity through
informed consent is significant only when one recognizes
that this right also encompasses a right to informed
refusal.17
5
Revitalizing the legal doctrine of informed consent along the
lines suggested here will not, in itself, guarantee a change in doc-
tors' customs and practices. Other changes-in professional atti-
tudes, in medical school training, and, perhaps most important,
in public insistence on improved patterns of communication on
the part of doctors-will be necessary before informed consent
and informed refusal become firmly established features of med-
ical life. But there are signs that these changes are developing. 17 6
The law should foster these developments by adding its own
weight on the side of genuine informational sharing among doc-
tors, patients and families.
3. Providing compassionate support to the patient and family
Caring doctors have always been part of the ideal in
medicine. It is of obvious importance in care of the severely ill.
Without belaboring the point, I suggest three ways in which
physicians might act to come closer to the ideal. First, they must
learn how to convey information in an empathetic way that pre-
serves honesty and maximal clarity of thought. This is not easy,
as the experience of doctors on a burn unit shows:
It took many months before we could shed a "we know
best" defense and actually ask the patient what he
175. Id.
176. The public, for example, has become aroused over specific medical issues such as
the safety of the childhood pertussis vaccine. A citizens' group is lobbying for state laws
mandating specific physician disclosures of vaccine risks and benefits, and has achieved
its first success in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE §§ 18-328 to 18-332 (Supp. 1985). The
citizens' group is the Dissatisfied Parents Together of Vienna, Virginia, see, Maryland
Passes First DPT Reform Law In U.S., DISSATISFIED PARENTS TOGETHER NEWS, Fall
1984, at 1.
Physician attitudes have at least been subject to scrutiny and criticism by some
within the profession. See articles by Kassirer, supra note 109; Imbus and Zawacki, infra
note 177; Bedell and Delbanco, supra note 116; and Moral and Ethical Dilemmas, supra
note 80. Medical school training is beginning to include attention to doctor-patient com-
munication, ethics, and humane care. See Hechinger, Medical Text Revives Lost Skill:
Compassion, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1984, at C5, col. 1.
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wanted on admission when he was most competent to de-
cide. Our approach seems obvious and right to us now;
the first few times were agonizing. Our words seemed
clumsy and awkward. If we had acted individually, with-
out colleague support, the plan would probably have re-
verted rapidly to denial, or even worse, to a paternalistic
decision making for the patient.1 7
Patients and families, these doctors found, reacted well to
their efforts at open and compassionate communication:
The very frequent question-"Am I going to die?"-is
answered truthfully by the statement, "We cannot pre-
dict the future. We can only say that, to our knowledge,
no one in the past of your age and with your size of burn
has ever survived this injury, either with or without max-
imal treatment." At this point, those who interpret this
diagnosis of a burn without precedent of survival as an
indication to avoid heroic measures typically become
quite peaceful. Regularly, they then try to live their lives
completely and fully to the end, saying things that they
must say to those important to them, making proper
plans, preparations and apologies and, in general, ob-
taining what Kavanaugh refers to as "permission to die."
These patients receive only ordinary medical measures
and sufficient amounts of pain medication to assure com-
fort after their choice is made explicit. Fluid resuscita-
tion is discontinued, they are admitted to a private room,
and visiting hours become unlimited. An experienced
nurse and, frequently, a chaplain are in constant attend-
ance, using their expertise to comfort and sustain the pa-
tient and his family, chiefly by their continued presence
and willingness to listen.178
Second, doctors must stay involved with the hopelessly ill
patient and his family, and resist the temptation to avoid them
and withdraw all attention. Withdrawal is regularly observed,
177. Imbus & Zawacki, Autonomy for Burned Patients When Survival is Unprece-
dented, 297 NEw ENG. J. ME. 308, 310 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Imbus & Zawacki].
178. Id. at 309.
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and engenders patient despair and family bitterness. 7 Third,
doctors can help families to make difficult decisions about treat-
ment withdrawal. This requires at least some familiarity with
the ethics of such decisions, with the common emotional re-
sponses of people facing them, and with techniques used suc-
cessfully by others to allay guilt and other emotional blocks to
sound decisionmaking. 80 Some of these matters may be better
handled by others on the health care team, 8' but the physician,
as the leading health professional in the eyes of patients and
families, can not disclaim all responsibility for them.
4. Screening out abusive family decisions
Although judging by the extensive literature in the field,
families rarely press for treatment refusals without reason or for
ill motives, the possibility of abusive decisionmaking by families
must be taken into account. I suggest that health professionals
are the most appropriate and best situated people to insure that
patients are not victimized by abusive family decisionmaking.
They are best situated to do so because any decision about med-
ical options must be implemented by them. If a family directs
the physician to disconnect from a respirator a person whose
loss of consciousness is not irreversible, for example, it would be
an obvious abuse to do so. As a professional, a doctor has an
obligation not to engage in abusive treatment of patients, so as-
signing the role to physicians of "screening out" abusive family
decisions about treatment refusal is not an unusual or unex-
pected burden. In other contexts, the law has looked to physi-
cians to prevent abuse. In Parham v. J.R., 82 for example, the
Court looked to medical professionals to prevent improper at-
tempts by parents to commit their children to state mental in-
stitutions. 83 The Court rejected arguments that only adversary
proceedings could screen out abusive family decisions.
84
179. See supra note 156.
180. E.g., Moral and Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 80, at 891.
181. See Cassileth, supra note 107,
182. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 597. One need not agree with the Supreme Court's application of this
point to Parham facts. Parents attempting to institutionalize their children are volunta-
rily initiating a family separation, and psychological evidence exists suggesting that par-
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Landeros v. Flood'85 held that doctors may also be required to
diagnose some forms of child abuse and to prevent further abuse
by keeping a battered child in the hospital rather than returning
the child to its abusive custodians. 86 These cases illustrate the
law's recognition that in medical situations, doctors normally
should and do act to prevent ill-motivated family members from
using health professionals to assist in the abuse of another fam-
ily member.
The doctor's "screening out" role, it should be noted, is a
limited one. It does not empower a physician to challenge a fam-
ily's decisionmaking authority unless the family's decisions are
clearly beyond reasonable bounds or motivated by malice or ill-
will. The function of preventing abuse is not intended to permit
professionals to substitute their own judgments for those of fam-
ilies in the usual situation, but to block abusive judgments in the
rare situation.
THE ROLE OF COURTS
As dilemmas develop in a complex society, and notions of
"rights" expand, more frequent resort to courts for all manner of
problem solving can be expected.18 7 Before accepting this reli-
ance on the judicial process in the treatment/nontreatment con-
text, however, it is important to consider the drawbacks of court
involvement in these matters. These drawbacks suggest that ju-
dicial resolution is neither inevitable nor desirable in the large
majority of treatment withdrawal decisions.
Delay
The law's delay is an old complaint and one of great impor-
tance in the medical decisionmaking context. It is a common-
ents sometimes seek to characterize a child as the problem to avoid facing their own
substantial emotional problems. See, e.g., NAPIER & WHITAKER, THE FAMILY CRUCIBLE,
(1978). In these circumstances, the medical experts' "screening" may not be reliable
enough. In the case of a hopelessly ill family member, any separation is brought on by
involuntary illness, and the psychological evidence that family members act upon im-
proper motives is absent.
i85. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
186. Id.
187. Friedman, Exposed Nerves: Some Thoughts on Our Changing Legal Culture, 17
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 529 (1983).
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place occurrence in the withdrawal-of-treatment cases that have
been brought to court that the patient dies during the time it
takes for the trial court and the appellate review process to
work.18s In the case of Earl Spring, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts noted that the case was still unresolved a year
after it began. 89 The court urged greater dispatch in the future,
but litigation realities-the need to investigate the facts, prepare
testimony, do legal research, and prepare arguments at each
level of the trial-appellate process, with all lawyers and judges
involved needing time to familiarize themselves with the
case-hamper speedy decisionmaking.
Changing Facts
Severe illness is not a static phenomenon. Physical symp-
toms and functioning can change rapidly. One physician has de-
scribed the "kaliedoscope of symptoms" that occurs in the
chronically ill that require treatment/nontreatment decisions. 90
The severely ill patient also frequently suffers from multiple dis-
eases, which fluctuate in their intensities and in their effects on
bodily and mental functions.1 91 Even where only a single disease
is present, physical changes occur which call for new evaluation
of treatment choices and goals. Moreover, when clinical crises
arise, they must be addressed on the spot.
Courts that have dealt with persons in the persistent vege-
tative state (most of the reported cases) may not appreciate the
variability of other conditions. When speed, flexibility of re-
sponse, and continual re-assessment are necessary, the short-
comings of the judicial process are apparent. A medical practi-
tioner engaged in the care of chronically ill and severely
debilitated individuals observes: "the facts are that these deci-
sions usually need to be made quickly (within hours or days),
repeatedly (options with respect to quality of life, prognosis, and
treatment may vary from day to day), and with a considerable
degree of medical expertise.'
92
188. See, e.g., In re Eichner and In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (reported together); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372.
189. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 641, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123.
190. Hanratty, supra note 132, at 2.
191. Battin, supra note 163, at 15.
192. Hilfiker, supra note 123, at 718. The author concluded that it was "ridiculous"
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Burdensomeness
Court proceedings are a great burden for the families of the
severely ill, especially so since they are already under great
stress. The process is exhausting, expensive, and intimidating.
Karen Ann Quinlan's father, who eventually won the right to di-
rect discontinuation of respirator support for his comatose
daughter, was quoted as saying, "that was terrifying having to go
to court."1 93
The delay occasioned by court involvement increases uncer-
tainty and anxiety, and keeps the family in limbo. The delay
may also mean additional and substantial hospital expenses,
physician expenses and treatment costs, all of which presumably
continue at maximal levels while the matter is pending in court.
Running up the medical bill is unfair to the family that has
carefully and agonizingly reached its own decision to stop treat-
ment, but must wait weeks, months, or more for court approval.
The stress of adversary proceedings is well known. Benja-
min Cardozo wrote that lawsuits are "catastrophic experiences"
for most people.194 Learned Hand said "[A]s a litigant I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death."1 95 In treatment refusal cases, courts will often ap-
point a guardian ad litem specifically charged with the task of
presenting all arguments in favor of treatment. 96 Thus adver-
sariness is assured, along with the trepidation, exposure, con-
frontation, and loss of autonomy that the family as litigants
experience.
to believe the courts could act promptly enough in these matters. Id. See also Dunn,
Who "Pulls the Plug": The Practical Effect of the Saikewicz Decision, 6 MEDICOLEGAL
NEWS 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dunn].
193. Norman, Our Towns: The Quinlans and the Latest Right to Die Ruling, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B4, col. 4.
194. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921).
195. Learned Hand, Address Delivered Before the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926).
196. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728,756, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433. This role for the guardian ad litem encourages appeals,
further delaying the proceeding.
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Loss of Privacy and Autonomy
A lawsuit brings a private issue into a public forum. For the
issue under discussion here, legal proceedings bring strangers, in
the form of lawyers and judges, into a most private matter of
family life. The most personal of emotions-grief, love, sorrow,
regret-go on display in the courtroom. Since these cases often
attract the attention of the media, the family may be beseiged
by reporters and subject to even wider privacy invasions. 197
In addition, the involvement of legal professionals brings
with it a more subtle, but very significant, sense of loss. This is a
loss of control, which laypeople experience when professionals
make their searching inquiries and tell their clients what to do,
in an atmosphere familiar to the professional but alien and dis-
orienting to the non-professional. In such circumstances, the
family is likely to feel that the professionals have taken control.
In a society where family autonomy is a basic value, this conse-
quence of court involvement is a serious negative element.
Chilling Effect
If asserting the right of an incompetent patient to forego medi-
cal treatment means going through the distress and trauma of
legal proceedings, it is possible that those closest to the incom-
petent patient will be influenced not to assert the right.198 Bur-
dening the exercise of a right with adversarial procedural re-
quirements will deter some, and for them the right is rendered a
nullity.199 The deterrent effect of required court procedures has
been recognized by two courts considering withdrawal of life
support from patients in the vegetative state.200 There is no rea-
son to suppose the effect on the family is any less when the
197. Bayley, Who Should Decide?, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at
7.
198. Rosoff describes a situation in which the family of an irreversibly vegetative pa-
tient requested removal of life support systems. Hospital representatives, fearing liabil-
ity, said "We'd like to do this. Why don't you bring a lawsuit against the hospital." The
family could not afford the expense and did not want the publicity of a lawsuit. The
hospital refused to act. Five months passed before the patient died. The medical bill was
$110,000, of which Medicare paid $80,000. Rosoff, Living Wills and Natural Death Acts,
in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 186-87.
199. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
200. In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738; In re Bludsworth, 452 So.2d 921.
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stricken family member is in a dire condition short of the vege-
tative state.
Courts Have No Special Competence To Make These Decisions
For those instances in which stopping treatment is not be-
yond the bounds of society's widely shared sense of morality,
judges can not claim any particular competence to make treat-
ment/nontreatment decisions for others. Such decisions require
a moral, philosophical, or religious set of values; without these it
is impossible to determine whether the benefits of treatment
outweigh the burdens.201 Government officials, including judges,
should not be selecting among competing, acceptable moral phi-
losophies.2 2 Moral diversity on the issue of treatment refusal ex-
ists in the society at large. The government, in a free society,
ought to respect that diversity.
These objections, compelling as they are, would be unavail-
ing if it could be shown that court intervention was absolutely
necessary to protect the interests of patients and society. But
there is nothing in our experience to date to indicate that deci-
sions for non-treatment are being made precipitously, or that
private decisionmaking is producing unacceptable results. 03 As
Judge Jones of the New York Court of Appeals, dissenting in In
re Storar, wrote, there is "no empirical evidence that society or
its individual members have suffered significantly in conse-
quence of the absence of judicial oversight. '20 4
Indeed, there is some cause to think that judicial interven-
tions, when attempted, have failed to improve the quality of
decisionmaking. In addition to lacking an appropriate source of
values to apply, judges also are poorly situated to find and inter-
pret the facts. To resolve cases, judges depend upon facts and
their proof. But the "facts" in these matters are subject to
201. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30.
202. Abram & Wolf, Public Involvement in Medical Ethics: A Model for Government
Action, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 627 (1984). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973):
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus [on the question of when life begins], the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as
to the answer."
203. See supra note 88.
204. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 386. 420 N.E.2d 64, 76, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 278.
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widely varying interpretation. For example, the facts of the
Storar case in the lower court 0 5 offered a grim picture of Mr.
Storar's life. John Storar, a mentally retarded man dying of
bladder cancer, began receiving substantial blood transfusions
every eight days, until his mother refused to consent to further
transfusions. 2 6 Mr. Storar, in the lower court, is portrayed as a
man whose physical condition is severely and steadily deterio-
rating; he rarely ventures outside his room; he is subject to ex-
treme pain, which will increase as his cancer unavoidably
spreads.2 07 The transfusions can not save his life, they cause him
great distress, he dreads and cannot understand them, and in
significant ways they make his suffering worse.20 8 With or with-
out them, he will die in a matter of months.20 9 His mother does
not want to subject him to them and thereby prolong his intense
pain and suffering.210 She is very protective of and close to her
son.
21 1
In the Court of Appeals, John Storar's life sounds quite dif-
ferent. He is said to be more energetic after transfusions; he is
feeding himself, showering, taking walks and running; he even
engages in some "mischievous" behavior.21 2 With the transfu-
sions, the Court says, he is "essentially the same as he was
before.12 " The trial court judge saw Mr. Storar suffering greatly.
The appellate court saw him enjoying life, with some occasional
distress. The difference is disturbing to one's faith in judicial
factfinding. In part the problem may stem from the difficulty in
knowing what the incompetent patient is experiencing. To know
this requires an empathy with the patient that comes with inti-
macy and involvement with him over time. John Storar's mother
had this sort of intimacy and involvement. The trial judge recog-
nized this: "Mrs. Storar, over her son's lifetime, has come to un-
derstand his wants and needs and is acutely sensitive to his best
interests. . . . She is closer to feeling what John is feeling than
205. In re Storar, 106 Misc.2d 880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 882-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 391-93.
212. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 374, 420 N.E.2d 64, 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 271.
213. Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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anyone else."'1 14 The appeals court rejected Mrs. Storar's assess-
ment and substituted its own. I suggest that Mrs. Storar's sense
of the facts of her son's experience of pain and suffering is
greater and more reliable than any court's, most especially an
appellate court working from a printed record.
The judicial orientation toward provable facts leads some
courts to inappropriately delimit their factual inquiry. Certain
facts which are subject to proof are given undue prominence,
e.g., the degree of invasiveness of a proposed treatment. To an
irreversibly comatose patient, this fact is of little significance,
but a Connecticut court looking for objective data made much of
this fact in justifying its decision. 16 In another case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court selected out the existence of severe pain
as the most critical fact in deciding on the appropriateness of
continuing medical treatment.21 The focus on pain failed to al-
low other humane values to play their proper role in decision-
making for a severely debilitated, elderly woman in an extreme
condition bordering on the vegetative.2 17
Court interventions also make matters worse when judges
devise special procedural rules for these situations. An Ohio
court, for example, after authorizing a husband to direct the dis-
connection of a mechanical respirator from his chronically vege-
tative wife, required that notice be given to the county coroner
and county prosecutor, so that they could send representatives
to witness the act of disconnection. 218 A more needless, offensive
presence at such a time is difficult to imagine. Another court in-
sisted that formal legal guardianship proceedings be instituted
in all treatment refusal cases. 21 9 It rescinded this requirement
one year later. 2 0
In its first major case on the subject, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court appeared to say that all instances of with-
214. 106 Misc.2d at 885, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
215. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
216. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33.
217. The dissenter in Conroy adopted this view. Id. at 374-76, 486 A.2d at 1244-50.
See Annas, When Procedures Limit Rights: From Quinlan to Conroy, HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 24 (April 1985).
218. Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8, 426 N.E.2d 809, 816.
219. In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 119-21, 660 P.2d 738, 746-49.
220. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 812, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377.
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drawal of life support treatment had to be submitted to and de-
cided by judges."' Later it modified this position, after
generating confusion and chaos in tertiary care hospitals all over
the country. ' In New York, an appellate court came up with an
elaborate procedure that would have involved as many as six
doctors, five attorneys and a judge, for all proposed withdrawals
of treatment.23 Fortunately, the ruling was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.224
The overuse of procedure by these courts appears to be the
legal profession's counterpart to medicine's tendency to over-
treat. Doing nothing seems difficult for professionals, but it is
sometimes the wisest course. As a Florida appellate court has
said: "We must remember that the conscience of society in these
matters is not something relegated to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the court."2 5
The care of incompetents has always been left to the family,
and the government has not intervened, absent evidence of
abuse. It is submitted that this tradition, and the fundamental
values underlying it,226 should extend to family decisionmaking
for the severely ill. When there is a willing family decisionmaker
available, resort to the courts is appropriate in only the most
limited circumstances, e.g., when there is irreconcilable conflict
among family members or clear evidence of wrongful motives, or
a strong basis for believing that the choice selected is beyond
any reasonable bounds. It is not appropriate when the family
has made a plausible choice (even if others might have chosen
differently), or when hospitals merely seek the legal comfort of a
court order. 27
221. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755-
59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433-34.
222. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636-41, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120-23. The chaos and con-
fusion is recounted in Dunn, supra note 192. The protest from the medical community
was so vigorous that Justice Liacos, author of the Saikewicz opinion, took the unusual
step of defending the decision before a conference of health professionals. See Liacos,
Dilemmas of Dying, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 149.
223. In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
224. In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
225. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 372 (Fla. App. 1984).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
227. Hospitals could be prevented from bringing cases by denying them standing in
these matters. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 373-74 n.3, 420 N.E.2d 64, 69 n.3,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 271 n.3.
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ETHICS COMMITTEES
Interest in the creation of hospital ethics committees has
grown enormously in recent years. 228 The basic notion is to put
together a group of people that would participate in the process
of deciding questions relating to withdrawal of treatment for the
critically ill, particularly where incompetent patients are in-
volved. Major questions about such committees abound, includ-
ing when these committees would function, how they would be
constituted, and whether they would be a advisory body or a
decisionmaking body. These issues, and many more, are being
addressed in articles and conferences now, and in some cases in
experimental programs in hospitals.2 9
With so many possibilities open, it is impossible to assess
the value of ethics committees in general. Potentially, a body
specifically designed to consider and advise on the ethical, psy-
chological, social and legal aspects of care of the hopelessly ill
can raise the consciousness of those who now refuse to acknowl-
edge the true problems of this area of medical care. Withdrawal,
avoidance and denial are all too common human reactions to
difficult situations. A committee can focus attention and bring
information and insight to bear on complex, value-laden, and
emotionally difficult matters.
While the formation of ethics committees holds some prom-
ise, it is too soon for courts or legislatures to endorse their use.
First, committees may function in such a way as to add to a
patient's or family's problems. Patient autonomy may suffer at
the hands of a committee run in a bureaucratic manner, or con-
stituted of hospital personnel who see their role as protective of
the institution rather than the patient. Committees composed
largely of physicians may increase the problem of professional
dominance that already exists in medical settings. Families
forced by hospital rules to go before an ethics committee may
feel intimidated, be uncomfortable baring their problems before
a group of strangers, or generally feel their privacy and indepen-
dence threatened and compromised. Busy committee members
228. Malcolm, Hospital Panels Consider Key Ethics Issues, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1984, at 1, col, 4.
229. See, INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING
(Cranford and Doudera eds. 1984).
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may not devote the necessary time to committee work, which
should include their own self-education in current moral, medi-
cal, psychological, and social thought on the issue.230
Ethics committees, if indeed they are to be part of the solu-
tion to dilemmas of medical decisionmaking and not part of the
problem, must find their way carefully and cautiously. These
committees exist in a minority of hospitals, and are in the earli-
est stages of development.2 31 Considerably more experience with
them is needed before their role in decisionmaking for the criti-
cally ill incompetent patient can be firmly established. For the
present, courts are best advised not to require their use.2 32
THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
The question of choosing not to treat critically or terminally
ill persons is complicated by the role that criminal law plays in
this area. Prosecutions of doctors for terminating life support in
hopeless cases are extremely rare.233 But the possibility of crimi-
nal prosecution was indelibly imprinted on physicians' minds
when a Los Angeles prosecutor charged two California doctors
with murder when they disconnected a deeply comatose man
from a respirator. 2 4 The doctors did so at the request of the
family, after medical tests indicated the patient had suffered se-
vere brain damage and was in a permanent vegetative state.235
The murder charges were rejected by a magistrate, reinstated by
a superior court judge, and finally dismissed by an appellate
230. For more detailed discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of ethics
committees, see, Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers about Hospital
Ethics Committees, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 9 (June 1984), Levine, Hospital Ethics Commit-
tees: A Guarded Prognosis, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 25 (June 1977); Veatch, The Ethics of
Institutional Ethics Committees, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH
CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 229, at 35.
231. McCormack, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, 12 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE
150 (1984); Youngner, Coulton, Juknialis and Jackson, Patients' Attitudes Toward Hos-
pital Ethics Committees, 12 L., MED. AND HEALTH CARE 21, 22 (1984).
232. The Georgia Supreme Court in In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984);
and the Washington Supreme Court in In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, both
adopted this position.
233. Ginnex, A Prosecutor's View on Criminal Liability for Withholding Medical
Care: The Myth and the Reality, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS supra note 10.
234. Barber v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
235. Id.
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court.2"' The publicity the case received was vast and it gener-
ated insecurity and fear throughout the medical profession.2"7
The Barber case showed that an indictment could happen. The
fact that it was ultimately dismissed on appeal in California did
not provide any guarantee that similar charges would not be
brought elsewhere, since the question of what behavior consti-
tutes murder is a matter of individual state law. Moreover, pros-
ecutors throughout the nation have other state criminal laws to
draw upon, such as criminal negligence, aiding a suicide, and en-
dangering the welfare of an incompetent person. 38
Prosecutors are also visible in these matters because of the
practice of courts, when considering applications by patients or
their families to disconnect life support systems, of seeking the
involvement of the local district attorney.239 At other times, re-
ports of a grand jury investigation may indicate to medical pro-
fessionals that a local prosecutor is paying attention to their
conduct. 2' Occasionally, prosecutors will speak at conferences of
health professionals, airing their views about when murder,
manslaughter, or other criminal charges might be brought. 1
One result of this is that the fear of criminal action seri-
ously impairs sound treatment/nontreatment decisionmaking for
the critically and terminally ill. Hospitals insist on court orders
to protect themselves, even when family members and physi-
cians agree on the futility of treatment.2 2 At times, even compe-
tent patients with terminal illnesses who direct cessation of
treatment are forced to go to court by fearful health profession-
als.243 Prominent doctors have felt it necessary to urge their col-
236. Id.
237. See Flaherty, A Right to Die? The Premier Privacy Issue of the 1980's, Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Towers, Irreversible Coma and Withdrawal of Life Sup-
port: Is it Murder if the IV line is Disconnected?, 8 J. MED. ETHICS 203 (1982).
238. These laws were noted in Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334,
1346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980).
239. See, e.g., In re Eichner 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, Leach
v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809.
240. See, e.g., Sullivan, Hospital's Data Faulted in Care of Terminally Ill, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1984, at B1, col. 4.
241. See, e.g., Oakes, A Prosecutor's View of Treatment Decisions, LEGAL AND ETHI-
CAL ASPECTS, supra note 10, at 194-99.
242. See supra notes 198 and 227.
243. E.g., In re Lydia Hall Hospital, 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706; Patient
May Refuse Life-Support Care, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Annas, Prisoner
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leagues not to subordinate the best interests of their patients to
their own self-interests in avoiding the threat of legal liability.
24 4
While such sentiments express worthy ideals, doctors can not re-
alistically be expected to put aside all concern for their own per-
sonal and professional lives, and the evidence is clear that they
do not.
Examples of distorted medical decisionmaking abound. In
some instances, doctors have refused to disconnect life support
systems from persons who are brain-dead.26 At one New York
hospital, officials insisted on court approval to disconnect a pa-
tient who previously clearly expressed her wish not to be artifi-
cially maintained in a vegetative state, despite clear legal prece-
dent permitting doctors to do so without court authorization.
When the court order was granted, the hospital, displaying the
utmost in timidity and unprofessionalism, asked the court not to
direct its personnel to perform the actual disconnection.4 6 Phy-
sicians and hospitals have adopted unusual and even bizarre
practices to avoid accountability for nontreatment decisions. Or-
ders not to resuscitate, for example, have not been written on
the patient's chart. Instead, they are whispered, pencilled in on
the chart and erased, written in code on a blackboard, or indi-
cated by means of a purple "dot" affixed to papers in the pa-
tient's file.247 These practices increase the possibility of mis-
takes, such as occurred in the purple dot system, when a patient
was not resuscitated even though no definite diagnosis had been
made, and no prior notice of the nonresuscitation order was
given to the patient or family.2 4s Such secretive practices, in ad-
in the ICU: The Tragedy of William Bartling, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (Dec. 1984).
244. Wanzer, supra note 145, at 956.
245. Woman, 44, Dies After Judge Allows a Halt to Life Support, N.Y. Times, Sept.
1, 1984, at 26, col. 5: Annas, Defining Death: There Ought to be a Law, HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 20, 21 (Feb. 1983).
246. In re Moschella, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1984, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. May
21, 1984).
247. Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 115, at 15 (orders erased, whispered); Nicholson,
Secret Grade System for Cancer Patients at Top Hospital, N.Y. Post, Mar. 26, 1984, at
3, col. 1 (blackboard code); N.Y. STATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR MEDICAID FRAUD
CONTROL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JANUARY THIRD ADDITIONAL 1983 GRAND JURY CON-
CERNING "Do NOT RESUSCITATE" PROCEDURES AT A CERTAIN HOSPITAL IN QUEENS COUNTY
4, 12-16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JANUARY THIRD GRAND JURY]
(purple dot system).
248. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JANUARY THIRD GRAND JURY, supra note 247, at 7.
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dition to risking error, discourage doctors from speaking openly
with families about nontreatment options and from obtaining
their informed consent.
The untoward effects on decisionmaking for the severely ill
might be worth the cost if a criminal act were truly being de-
terred. But the disconnection of life support systems by doctors
acting at the behest of families should not be considered a crimi-
nal act, absent extraordinary circumstances (e.g., if doctors know
the condition is curable). The Barber court dismissed the indict-
ment against the accused surgeon and internist in part based
upon a distinction between "omission" and "commisssion."249
Discontinuing the use of artificial respiration and feeding de-
vices, the court concluded, was not an affirmative act of commis-
sion.250 The court reasoned:
Even though these life support devices are, to a degree,
"self-propelled," each pulsation of the respirator or each
drop of fluid introduced into the patient's body by intra-
venous feeding devices is comparable to a manually ad-
ministered injection or item of medication. Hence "dis-
connecting" of the mechanical devices is comparable to
withholding the manually administered injection or
medication.2
This reasoning, although it leads to the right result, is unsatis-
factory. Other courts might rationally label the same conduct
acts of "commission," by focusing on the positive action needed
to stop the machines and to remove the tubes.2 2 The decision
should not hinge on labeling, but on basic notions of what we
mean, and don't mean, by homicide.
Disconnection is not homicide, it is submitted, for the same
reason that a request for cessation of treatment by a competent
patient is not suicide. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, rejecting the notion that a patient's refusal of lifesaving
treatment was suicide, noted that "(1) in refusing treatment the
patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if
he did, to the extent that the cause of death was from natural
249. Barber v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See discussion in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 369-70, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234.
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causes the patient did not set the death producing agent in mo-
tion with the intent of causing his own death."2 53 Similarly,
when a family decides to stop treatment, based on a hopeless
diagnosis, it is not their desire to kill, and if death seems inevita-
ble, it is not their fault when it occurs.254
Since so few cases are actually brought, those which are
seem random and capricious. Prosecutors who bring them are
acting deviantly, in comparison to the vast majority of their col-
leagues. They may be politically motivated,255 or publicity seek-
ing. Describing the activity of the prosecutor in the Barber case,
medical writer Bernard Towers observed:
With each step in the case to date, the media coverage
has become more intense. During the August flurry of ac-
tivity the DDA [Deputy District Attorney] was every-
where to be seen and heard and read about. He must
have devoted many hours to being in front of news cam-
eras, microphones, and tape recorders.2 51
The elixir of mass media attention may well be intoxicat-
ing.2s Whatever the motive for bringing these cases, the freakish
nature of them is another argument favoring de-criminalization
of this area of medical decisionmaking. Courts in other contexts
have disapproved of arbitrary and capricious uses of the crimi-
nal law.25 8 Our basic sense of fairness and justice is offended by
infrequent prosecutions which have an air of randomness about
them. This is especially so when the legal standards prosecutors
employ are vague, ill-defined, or confused. Consider the follow-
ing statements by three different prosecutors:
253. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743
n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11.
254. A literal reading of the homicide laws, without thought for their point and pur-
pose, could produce a contrary conclusion (situation in which the family would be held
culpable), but that simply highlights the need for sense and wisdom in statutory
interpretation.
255. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION supra note 15, at 93 n.6; Vorenberg, Decent Re-
straint on Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1558 (1981).
256. Towers, supra note 237, at 205.
257. Cf. Hurson, The Trial of a Highly Publicized Case-A Prosecutor's View, 16
AM. CraM. L. REV. 473 (1979).
258. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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I do not believe that a no-code situation [i.e., a do-not-
resuscitate order] will ever result in any type of prosecu-
tion. Withdrawal of life support, on the other hand, is
not so clear. The withdrawal of hydration and nutrition
may cause physicians to come within the concern of the
prosecutor's office. The inevitability of death in those sit-
uations is so great that you must attribute an intent to
kill to the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition."'
Personally I can understand when a physician, surrogate,
or parent makes a treatment decision based on his or her
view of the quality of the patient's life. . . . Yet while I
understand that this issue will be considered in the nor-
mal treatment decisionmaking process, I am offended if
quality of life considerations are allowed to enter into the
courtroom and affect the court's decisionmaking
process.6
[T]he criminal law prevents termination of treatment de-
cisions from being made on "quality of life"
assessments.6
The first prosecutor broadly questions the "withdrawal of
life support," making an exception for orders not to resuscitate.
The basis for distinguishing such orders from other nontreat-
ment decisions is left vague and unstated. What about discon-
tinuing respirators, stopping powerful drug treatments, allowing
pneumonia to go untreated in a patient dying of cancer, failing
to give blood transfusions, kidney dialysis, and a host of other
treatments to the hopelessly ill? Doctors must guess how such a
prosecutor would react to all of these possibilites. Even if they
could figure out this prosecutor's views, what about his counter-
part in the next county?
This prosecutor also steps boldly into an ill-defined area of
the law when he treats the withdrawal of nutrition and hydra-
259. Oakes, supra note 241, at 199.
260. Stein, The Case of Phillip B: A Prosecutor's View, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL As-
PECTS supra note 10, at 202-03.
261. Nesbitt, supra note 78, at 247.
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tion as homicide. The question of whether we must keep alive a
permanently comatose patient, possibly for a decade, by medical
efforts to intubate and feed is one open to debate.2 " Murder
prosecutions, however, are inappropriate vehicles for resolving
such public policy questions. They cannot provide a forum for
public debate of such an issue, they subject the accused to the
harsh ordeal of criminal accusation and defense, and they rudely
publicize the grief and intensify the distress of the family
involved.
The second and third prosecutors quoted above would use
their offices to see that "quality of life" assessments do not enter
into decisionmaking. One prosecutor does recognize it as an un-
derstandable element in the hospital but not in the courtroom,
as if the basic question for decision changes with the physical
surroundings. These prosecutors refuse to see that the severely
low quality of life of people in extreme states of physical
debilitation is what makes us think of terminating life support
systems, not attempting to resuscitate, and otherwise not invok-
ing the array of medical interventions at our command. These
statements sweep so broadly, one might understand, if not ex-
cuse, the reluctance to withdraw life-support treatment from
even a brain-dead person until a court gave its approval and re-
moved the threat of criminal prosecution.2 63 Inevitably, doctors
will think twice about discussing nontreatment options with
families of critically ill, incompetent patients. Because of the
chilling effect of the threat of criminal prosecution, treatment
withdrawal may not even be presented to the family as an
option.
The good faith decisions of families and physicians to with-
hold or withdraw medical treatments deserve protection from
criminal prosecution. These decisions are not homicide accord-
ing to any rational view of that term. A murder prosecution is
262. Two courts have stated that medical interventions to artificially feed a patient
are not always required, and the withholding or withdrawal of these medical efforts
should be considered on the same basis as rejection of any other life-supporting treat-
ments. Barber v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484; In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 190, rec-
ommends that family and health professionals have the option to stop feeding perma-
nently unconscious patients. But see, Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water:
Against the Stream, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11 (Dec. 1984).
263. See supra note 226.
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surely not the proper forum for resolving the policy issues here
under discussion. The few prosecutors who do involve them-
selves in these issues seem to make matters worse with their
loose and confused remarks. The prosecutor's vast, virtually un-
reviewable discretion to bring criminal cases influences hospitals
and physicians to make decisions which are self-protective and
not in the best interests of patients. Courts and legislatures
should act promptly to de-criminalize this sphere of medical
decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested here that the family is entitled to make
treatment/nontreatment decisions for irreversibly, severely inca-
pacitated family members who cannot make their own medical
decisions. This choice should be made with the cooperation of
physicians who supply vital information on which these deci-
sions must be based. Health professionals also should contrib-
ute, as part of humane care, their emotional support, sympathy,
and understanding, helping to share the burdens that family
members suffer. Decisions should not be rushed, and time for
both discussion and reflection should be built in to the process.
Decisionmaking should be private, i.e., without the participation
of those outside the network of family, patient, and health care
professionals directly involved in providing care to the patient.
Exceptions to this privacy should be made only when the family
fails to reach a decision (because of internal conflicts, for exam-
ple) or when the decision is contrary to society's ."widely shared
ideals about human rights." 26" Exceptions should not be based
on a health provider's desire to usurp the decisionmaking func-
tion in order to substitute his or her own independent decision.
A family's reasoned decision should receive support in the vast
majority of cases. Health professionals who question the family's
considered decision should examine their own motivations
first.2"" If they are genuinely satisfied that an exception is war-
ranted, bringing in qualified outsiders (e.g., a hospital ethicist or
264. The phrase quoted is from Professor Tribe's discussion of rights of privacy and
personhood in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 985-90 (1978).
265. Physicians themselves are "strongly influenced by their personal values and un-
conscious motivations." Wanzer, supra note 145, at 956.
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ethics committee) is appropriate. The family should be told why
its decision is being challenged and be given the opportunity to
communicate its own reasons. Discussion may then provide a
resolution. If it does not, as a last resort, civil court action is
appropriate. In no event should good faith decisions to withhold
or withdraw treatment be subject to criminal prosecution.
Placing the family at the center of medical decisionmaking
for incompetent members affords respect for the family in its
privacy, its control over its own destiny, and its assertion of
moral and philosophical values. A check on unreasonable deci-
sionmaking by families exists, but it is one to be employed spar-
ingly, allowing latitude in decisionmaking to families who are
concerned about the patient and who voluntarily participate in
the decisionmaking process. This scheme of decision recognizes
the vital role played by professionals, but as expert advisers, not
as controllers of others' lives.

